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Pierce et al.: Tort Law

TORT LAW
I. COURT EXPANDS LANDOWNERS' DUTY OF CARE TO INVITEES

In Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp.' the South Carolina
Supreme Court adopted section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of2
Torts, greatly expanding the duty that landowners owe to invitees.
Under the Callanderrule, a landowner has a duty to warn an invitee of
an open and obvious defect if the landowner has reason to expect that the
defect might injure an invitee. 3
The plaintiff, Paul Lingos, was injured in the defendant's doughnut
shop when he fell after attempting to sit on a stool that was missing its
seat top. Lingos sued Charleston Doughnut Corporation and Krispy
Kreme Doughnut Corporation, alleging that the broken stool constituted
a latent defect in the premises. 4 The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff for $30,000, and the defendant appealed.' The court of appeals
held that the trial judge's jury instruction on latent defect was erroneous
because the evidence could not support a finding of latent defect.6 The
court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The plaintiff then
petitioned the supreme court for certiorari.7
The supreme court limited its review to whether the broken stool
was a latent defect.' The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals
that there was no evidence that the crowded condition of the doughnut
shop affected Lingos's ability to discover the missing seat top. 9 Justice

1. 305 S.C. 123, 406 S.E.2d 361 (1991).

2. Id. at 126, 406 S.E.2d at 362.
3. Id. at 125-26, 406 S.E.2d at 362-63.

4. Id. at 124-25, 406 S.E.2d at 362. Lingos admitted that he failed to look
behind him prior to sitting down. Lingos v. Charleston Doughnut Corp., 300 S.C.
317, 319, 387 S.E.2d 695, 695-96 (Ct. App. 1989), aff'd as modified sub nom.
Callander,305 S.C.. 123, 406 S.E.2d 361.

5. Callander,305 S.C. at 125,406 S.E.2d at 362. Defendant's appeal was based
on the following part of the trial judge's instruction to the jury:

"[W]here a dangerous condition in premises is... latent, or hidden, and
the owner knew or should have known ... [of it] and it is unknown to
a[n] ... invitee coming onto the premises, the owner is required to give
proper warning in order to relieve himself from liability for injuries
caused by the hidden or latent, unsafe or dangerous condition."
Lingos, 300 S.C. at 319, 387 S.E.2d at 696 (alterations in original).
6. Callander, 305 S.C. at 125, 406 S.E.2d at 362.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Chandler, writing for a unanimous court, defimed a latent defect as "one
which an owner has, or should have, knowledge of, and of which an
invitee is reasonably unaware" and "one which a reasonably careful
inspection will not reveal."10
However, the court declined to follow the "'no duty to warn of the
obvious' rule."" Instead, the court joined numerous jurisdictions that
have modified this rule to hold an owner liable for an invitee's injuries
caused by an open and obvious defect if the owner should have anticipated that the invitee would encounter the defective condition or would
likely be distracted. 2 The court specifically adopted section 343A of the
13
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The Callander decision was predictable in light of the wide
acceptance of section 343A,' 4 but the standard adopted by the court
poses a problem: section 343A is premised on the doctrine of contributory negligence and the closely associated doctrine of implied assumption
of risk. However, the supreme court did not indicate how this decision
and its recent adoption of comparative negligence15 are to interact. The
limitations that section 343A places on a landowner's liability to an
invitee are inconsistent with the supreme court's rejection of contributory
negligence. 6 Under the Restatement, "the fact that the danger is

10. Id. (citations omitted).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 125-26, 406 S.E.2d at 362 (citing Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640

F.2d 523, 531 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981); Tribe v.
Shell Oil Co., 652 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz. 1982); Shaffer v. Mays, 489 N.E.2d 35,
37 (11. App. Ct. 1986); Williams v. Boise Cascade Corp., 507 A.2d 576, 577 (Me.
1986); Southern Ry. v. ADM Milling Co., 294 S.E.2d 750, 756 (N.C. Ct. App.),

cert. denied, 299 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. 1982)).
13. Id. at 126, 406 S.E.2d at 362 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 343A(1) (1964) ("A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or
obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness.")).

14. See generally 62 AM. JUR. 2D PremisesLiability § 146-58 (1990) (discussing
the "no duty" rule and the Restatement rule); 62A AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability
§ 504 (1990) (discussing the application of the rules to commercial premises).
15. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991)
(abolishing doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence).
16. A comment to § 343A(1) states:
[]n the ordinary case, an invitee who enters land is entitled to nothing
more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers he will encounter if
he comes. If he knows the actual conditions, he is free to make an
intelligent choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is sufficient to
justify him in incurring the risk by entering or remaining on the land. The
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether the invitee is
to be charged with contributory negligence, or assumption of risk."17
Thus, although the court has discarded contributory negligence as an
affirmative defense, the court has apparently accepted a duty of care for
landowners that incorporates the basic concept of contributory negligence.
Two interpretations of section 343A have evolved because of this
conflict with the doctrine of comparative negligence.' 8 The Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have held that the
"knowledge" and "obviousness" elements in section 343A act as
limitations on the landowner's duty of care. 9 The Seventh Circuit
summarized this view by stating:
[W]e read Section 343 together with Section 343A not as providing
defenses but as defining when it is negligent to allow the existence
of a dangerous condition. Under the Restatement, when the danger
is open and obvious and in addition is avoidable in the exercise of
ordinary care and therefore the harm is not foreseeable, it is not
negligent to allow the danger to exist.2

possessor of the land may reasonably assume that he will protect himself
by the exercise of ordinary care, [i.e., avoid contributory negligence] or
that he will voluntarily assume the risk of harm if he does not succeed in
doing so. Reasonable care on the part of the possessor therefore does not
ordinarily require precautions, or even warning, against dangers which are
known to the visitor, or so obvious to him that he may be expected to
discover them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. e (1964).
17. Id. cmt. f (emphasis added).
18. The development of these two interpretations in the federal courts often
involved the application of § 343A to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act as amended to abolish the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. See Woolson v. Wells, 663 P.2d 408, 412 (Or. Ct. App. 1983),
aff'd, 687 P.2d 144 (Or. 1984) (en banc).
19. See Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, 596 F.2d 746,750 (7th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969 (1981); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners
Corp., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098
(1977); Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1976). The Fifth
Circuit also supported this approach until 1981, when it adopted the "reasonableness
approach." See Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir.
1977), rejected by McCullough v. SIS Coppename, 648 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir.
June 1981). For a discussion of the "reasonableness approach," see infra text
accompanying notes 23-25.
20. Clemons, 596 F.2d at 750 n.17.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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According to this interpretation, the knowledge element of section 343A
is integral in defining the landowner's duty to invitees.
In contrast the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted
an interpretation similar to that in Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 21
in which the court rejected section 343A as the proper standard for
measuring the duty of a landowner insofar as the section acts as a
complete bar to recovery.' Instead, these courts have adopted a
standard of care that closely resembles a reasonableness standard.73 In
analyzing the compatibility of section 343A with comparative negligence,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Restatement standard incorporates the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk into the
possessor's duty by allowing the possessor to rely on the invitees "to
discover conditions, realize their dangers, and then protect themselves
against the dangers."2 The court concluded that "[tlo apply the
limitations of... § 343A(1) to negligence suits.., would, in substance
if not in form, give defendant[s]... the benefits of a partial or absolute
bar to liability having the characteristics of a defense based upon
contributory negligence or implied assumption of risk or both."25
Most state courts that have addressed the effect of comparative
negligence on the knowledge element of section 343A have followed the
Gallardo approach.26 These courts have held that the adoption of
comparative negligence negates the operation of the knowledge element
in section 343A as a complete bar to liability. 27

21. 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
22. Id. at 493-95.
23. See Miller v. Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (adopting a "reasonableness standard" without expressly citing section
343A); McCullough v. SIS Coppename, 648 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. June 1981);
Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 340 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed,

449 U.S. 1135 (1981); De Los Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d
480, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1979), e'd and remanded, 451

U.S. 156 (1981).

24. De Los Santos, 598 F.2d at 486 n.5.
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 396-98 (Del. 1992); Harrison
v. Taylor, 768 P.2d 1321, 1328 (Idaho 1989); Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d
223, 229 (ill. 1990); Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 68183 (Mich. 1992); Cox v. J.C. Penney Co., 741 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. 1987) (en banc);
Woolston v. Wells, 663 P.2d 408, 411 (Or. Ct. Apti. 1983), aff'd, 687 P.2d 144 (Or.
1984) (en banc); Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cert. denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).
27. See, e.g., Koutoufaris, 604 A.2d at 396-97. Apparently, only Pennsylvania

has reached a contrary conclusion. See Carrenderv. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 125 (Pa.
1983).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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Comparative negligence, by definition, compares the negligence of
the opposing parties to determine if there should be a recovery for the
injury, and if so, what proportion of the damages each party should
bear.2 Applying the knowledge element of section 343A could circumvent the application of the comparative negligence standard by tipping the
scales against the existence of a duty and halting all inquiry at that point.
The more equitable and consistent approach isto recognize that an injury
occurred and to allow a jury to allocate fault between the parties under
a comparative fault analysis.
Therefore, the court should take the next available opportunity to
adopt a modified Gallardo approach, whereby the knowledge element,
with its underlying theme of contributory negligence, is removed from
determining a landowner's liability. Despite the potential drawbacks of
Callander,the court's attempt to move away from a harsh, inflexible "no
duty to warn of the obvious" rule in favor of a balancing approach is
commendable. However, the court's recent adoption of comparative
negligence may be frustrated by a duty of care for landowners that
includes the recently discarded doctrine of contributory negligence.
B. Dean Pierce

II. A MEMBER OF AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION CAN
SUE THE ASSOCIATION IN TORT

In Crocker v. Bar?9 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
an unincorporated association is amenable to suit by its members for
tortious acts.30 In reaching its decision, the court overruled an earlier
opinion by the South Carolina Court of Appeals, 3' which held that the

28. See N6ls6n v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
29. 305 S.C. 406, 409 S.E.2d 368 (1991).
30. Id. at 412, 409 S.E.2d at 372.
31. Crocker v.Barr, 295 S.C. 195, 367 S.E.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1988) (Crocker
1), overruledin partby Crocker v.Barr, 305 S.C. 406, 409 S.E.2d 368 (1991). The
procedural history of the present Crocker case is somewhat confusing because the
court granted certiorari to review Crocker v.Barr, 303 S.C. 1, 397 S.E.2d 665 (Ct.

App. 1990) (Crocker I) (holding that Crocker was a cotenant instead of an invitee;
therefore, defendants maintained no duty to inspect and warn member of latent
defect), rev'd, 305 S.C. 406, 409 S.E.2d 368 (1991). The supreme court reversed

CrockerII by holding that Crocker was an invitee. Crocker, 305 S.C. at 411-12, 409
S.E.2d at 371-72. However, the supreme court also overruled those portions of
Crocker I that were inconsistent with its opinion, although that case was not on
appeal. Id. at 412, 409 S.E.2d at 372.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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doctrine of imputed negligence prevents a member of a voluntary
unincorporated
association from maintaining an action in tort against the
32
association.
The plaintiff, Crocker, brought an action for personal injuries
against the Calhoun Falls Pentecostal Holiness Church, an unincorporated
association of which he was a member. While Crocker was voluntarily
working in the church attic, he fell after grabbing an unstable rafter that
had been left unsecured during prior construction on the church. As a
result of the fall, Crocker incurred approximately $36,850 in medical
bills and almost ten months of lost wages.33
In the original action, the circuit court dismissed Crocker's claim
based on the doctrine of imputed negligence, and the court of appeals
affirmed.34 Crocker then filed an action against the various individual
pastors and church board members allegedly responsible for the tort. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $300,000, but the
court of appeals reversed.3 5 This appeal followed.
In holding that various South Carolina statutes allow members to
bring tort actions against unincorporated associations,36 the Crocker
court implied that these statutes characterize unincorporated associations
as separate legal entities.37 The court's holding rests upon both statutory
interpretation and the rationale that members of such organizations

32. Crocker1, 295 S.C. at 198-200, 367 S.E.2d at 472-73. See generally P. H.

Vartanian, Annotation, Recovery by Member from UnincorporatedAssociationfor
Injuries Inflicted by Tort of Fellow Member, 14 A.L.R.2D 473 (1950 & Supp. 1987).
The annotation states the general rule regarding imputation of negligence as follows:

mhe members of an unincorporated association are engaged in a joint
enterprise, and the negligence of each member.., is imputable to each
and every other member, so that the member who has suffered damages

...through the tortious conduct of another member of the association
may not recover from the association for such damage, although he may
recover individually from the member actually guilty of the tort.

Id. at 473-74; see also 7 C.J.S. Associations § 53 (1980 & Supp. 1992) (stating
general rule); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations & Clubs § 31 (1963 & Supp. 1992)
(same).
33. Crocker, 305 S.C. at 407, 409 S.E.2d at 369.
34. Crocker1, 295 S.C. at 195, 367 S.E.2d at 472. The court of appeals noted

that the plaintiff could recover individually from those members of the association
responsible for his injuries. Id.
35. Crocker II, 303 S.C. 1, 397 S.E.2d 665.

36. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-5-160 and 15-35-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976),
construed in Crocker, 305 S.C. at 409, 409 S.E.2d at 370; S.C. CODE ANN. § 3355-210 (Law. Co-op. 1987), construed in Crocker, 305 S.C. at 410-11, 409 S.E.2d
at 370-71.

37. See Crocker, 305 S.C. at 411, 409 S.E.2d at 370-71.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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should have recourse against the association itself, rather than only
against its individual members."
39
The Crocker court relied on Joseph v. Calvary Baptist Church,
a case presenting a similar fact pattern, to illustrate the rule adopted in
the present case. Rather than adhering to the doctrine of imputed negligence, the Joseph court based its decision on Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure 17(B) and (E).' The Joseph court stated that prior Indiana
case law had interpreted these rules to circumvent the doctrine of
imputed negligence because the "actions of the association were no
longer to be attributed to each individual member."4
The Crocker court also justified its holding by using South Carolina
statutes and case law. The court relied on section 33-55-210 of the South
Carolina Code, which severs the' liability of charitable organization
employees from the organization itself.42 The court noted that this
statute accomplishes the same result as that reached by the Joseph
court.43 Moreover, the supreme court noted that the court in Elliott v.
Greer Presbyterian Church 4 interpreted the predecessor of section 1535-170 of the South Carolina Code' as severing the liability of an
individual association member in a manner similar to the Indiana rule
applied in Joseph.46

The supreme court also espoused a policy argument to support its
holding. The court noted: "Today, it is clear that many institutions must
rely to a large extent on volunteer labor. .

.

. It ignores reality to leave

a volunteer with no recourse against wrongdoers. The rule established by
38. Id.
39. 500 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), vacated, 522 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1988).
40. Joseph, 500 N.E.2d at 252. Rule 17(E) reads in part: "A partnership or an
unincorporated association may sue or be sued in its common name. A judgment by
or against the partnership or unincorporated association shall bind the organization
as if it were an entity." IND. R. TR. P. 17(E). For a discussion of the general rule
of imputed negligence for unincorporated associations, see sources cited supra note
32.
41. Joseph, 500 N.E.2d at 252.
42. Crocker, 305 S.C. at 410-11, 409 S.E.2d at 371 (construing S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law. Co-op. 1987)).
43. Id.
44. 181 S.C. 84, 186 S.E. 651 (1936).
45. Section 15-35-170 provides: "On judgment being obtained against an
unincorporated association ... final process may issue to recover satisfaction of such
judgment, and any property of the association and the individual property -of any
copartner or member thereof . . . shall be liable to judgment and execution for
satisfaction of any such judgment." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-170 (Law. Co-op.
1976).
at 409, 409
S.E.2d at 370.
46. Crocker,
305 S.C.
Published
by Scholar
Commons,
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the Court of Appeals in Crocker I chills the very volunteerism that
unincorporated associations require. "'
In its analysis, the Crocker court failed to discuss the doctrine of
imputed negligence. Instead, the court dismissed the doctrine outright
without any explanation. The court stated that "Elliott acts to sever the
liability of an individual association member in much the same manner
as the Indiana statute [sic] cited in Joseph."48 However, the Elliott
court's interpretation of the predecessor to section 15-35-170 does not
sever the liability of the members from the association in a way that
treats the unincorporated association as a separate legal entity. 49 Rather,
the Elliott court recognized that the members' liability is joint and
several, and that each member is individually responsible for the entire
judgment against the association.50
Although section 33-55-210 allows an action by "any person"
against a charitable organization in an amount not exceeding
$200,000,51 whether the South Carolina legislature intended the statute
to abolish the doctrine of imputed negligence, thereby opening the way
for litigation by association members, is unclear. Nevertheless, the
supreme court held that this statute abolishes the doctrine of imputed
negligence with respect to unincorporated associations in South Caroli52
na.
However, the Crocker court applied the statute ina confusing
manner. The statute applies to actions against a charitable organization,
yet the association was not before the court in this appeal. Crocker sued
the members of the church individually as present or former board
members, not as an association. 3 Under the statute, no judgment
against individual members may be returned unless the court finds that
they acted in a "reckless, wilful, or grossly negligent manner." 54 The
court circumvented the problem by stating that certain stipulations made

47. Id. at 41i, 409 S.E.2d at 371.
48. Id. at 409, 409 S.E.2d at 370.
49. See Elliott v. Greer Presbyterian Church, 181 S.C. 84, 86, 186 S.E. 651,
652 (1936).
50. Id. Moreover, the court in Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C.
498, 129 S.E. 830 (1925), expressly held that the severability conferred by the
predecessor to section 15-35-170 failed to confer upon an association a legal status
separate from its members. Id. at 502, 129 S.E. at 831.
51, S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
52. Crocker, 305 S.C. at 411, 409 S.E.2d at 371.
53. See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210(A) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19

8

Pierce et al.: Tort Law

1992]

TORT LAW

by the parties had the effect of creating a direct action against the
association.5
The Crocker opinion rests most soundly on its policy argument.
Many courts allow such actions based on distinctions in the kind of
unincorporated association involved.56 The supreme court stated that
members of such associations must be allowed "recourse against
wrongdoers."I 7 By preventing injured members from recovering against
the association itself, the general rule of imputed negligence58 forces
members to sue fellow members individually. Typically, these fellow
members are friends of the injured party or have little or no ability to
pay the judgment.
However, the argument that the general rule chills
"volunteerism"5 9 arguably operates differently in reality. The absence
of a cause of action against certain organizations, such as churches,
probably dissuades few volunteers from participating in the activities of
these associations.
The supreme court in Crocker v. Barr adopted the rule that
unincorporated associations are liable to their members for tortious
conduct. In doing so, the court abolished the doctrine of imputed
negligence for unincorporated associations by noting the severance of
liability between the members and the association itself. However, the
Crocker court arguably did not institute any safeguards to prevent
individual association members from having to satisfy a judgment against
the association. As long as section 15-35-170 remains effective,

55. Crocker,305 S.C. at 412, 409 S.E.2d at 372. As the court noted, the parties
stipulated that no judgment would be entered against any individuals, and that an
insurance company would pay any judgment Crocker received. Id. However, the
individual board members maintained that the agreement was misunderstood and that
the insurance company could deny coverage to all defendants. The defendants argued
that the agreementfdoes not convert the action into one against the association. See
Respondents' Petition for Rehearing at 4-7, Crocker v. Barr, 305 S.C. 406, 409
S.E.2d 368 (1991) (No. 91-29).
56. See, e.g., Marshall v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union, 371 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1962) (en bane); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen, 101 N.W.2d 782 (Wis. 1960). Marshall states that courts
developed the doctrine of imputed negligence by applying the rules of partnership law
to voluntary unincorporated associations. Partnership law regards a partnership as an
"aggregate of individuals with each partner acting as agent for all other partners."
Marshall, 371 P.2d at 989. The Marshall court argues that these rules have little
application to voluntary unincorporated associations, such as fraternities, clubs, and
labor unions, because these associations normally act through elected officials, and
individual members have little authority in the daily operations of the association. Id.
57. Crocker, 305 S.C. at 411, 409 S.E.2d at 371.
58. See supra note 32.
59. Crocker, 305 S.C. at 411, 409 S.E.2d at 371.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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association members may seek satisfaction of judgments against their
association from either the association itself or its individual members.' °
Brent M. Boyd

III. COURT APPLIES SOUTH CAROLINA COMMON-LAW DISTINCTION

BETWEEN LIBEL PER SE AND PER QUOD

In Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.6" the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that a newspaper article about the murder of the
appellant's daughter, which implied that the appellant was an unfit
mother and that a lack of family support contributed to the victim's
death, would, if untrue, constitute libel per se.62 Accordingly, the court
concluded that proof of special damage63 was not necessary for the
appellant to recover in her defamation action against the Newspaper.'
The Holtzscheiter court also held that evidence of how readers under-

60. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976). North Carolina
passed a statute that allows recovery against the real and personal property of an
association without satisfying the judgment through the individual assets of its
members. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69.1 (1983). Although North Carolina does not treat
unincorporated associations as legal entities, except in certain instances, the statute
provides an example of a law that is preferable to the corresponding provisions in

South Carolina.
61. 411 S.E.2d 664 (S.C. 1991) (3-2 decision).
62. Id. at 666. Libel per se refers to a publication that is defamatory on its face,
while libel per quod is a statement that derives a defamatory meaning only from
extrinsic facts. Id. at 665-66.
63. The court defined special damage as "economic loss to the plaintiff resulting
from injury to her reputation." Id. at 665 n.1 (citing F. PATRICK HUBBARD &
ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 401-02 (1990)). See
generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 7.01-.02 (5th ed. 1992)
(defining and distinguishing special harm, actual harm, and presumed harm).
64. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 666. Libel per se is "actionable without proof
of special damage." Id. (citing Capps v. Watts, 271 S.C. 276, 284-85 n.2, 246
S.E.2d 606, 611 n.2 (1978)). However, the Holtzscheitercourt declared that libel per
quod is treated like slander, and, to be actionable without proof of special damage,
a libel per quod must fall within one of the four special categories of slander per se.
Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 763 (4th ed. 1971)).
The four traditional classes of slander per se are: (1) imputation of crime, (2)
imputation of loathsome disease, (3) statement harming business, trade, profession
or office, and (4) accusation of unchastity. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 788-93 (5th ed. 1984);

SMOLLA, supra note 63, §§ 7.04-.05 (discussing the common-law background and
current usage of the four special slander per se categories).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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stood the allegedly defamatory language was admissible to show that the
article in fact conveyed "a libelous meaning on its face."65 Although the
court expanded upon the framework articulated in Capps v. Watts66 to

distinguish between libel per se and libel per quod, the Holtzscheiter
opinion does little to clarify the confusing common-law standard for
determining when proof of special damage is necessary to maintain an
action for libel.
Appellant, Sandra Prosser Holtzscheiter ("Holtzscheiter"), brought
suit against the publishers of the FlorenceMorning News ("Newspaper")
for defamation after the Newspaper reported the murder of Holtzscheiter's seventeen-year-old daughter, Shannon.67 The Newspaper article
contained a description of Shannon's family background, specifically
stating that she had "'no family support to encourage her to continue her
education.'"68 Holtzscheiter claimed that the article was defamatory
because it implied that she was "'an unfit, uncaring, irresponsible mother
and as such, contributed to her daughter's untimely and tragic death.'"69
The trial court directed a verdict for the Newspaper in the defamation action. 7 The court determined that the statement, if libelous,
was libel per quod; therefore, because Holtzscheiter did not offer the
required proof of special damage, her action could not be maintained.71
In addition, the trial court limited a line of testimony offered to show the
article's effect on readers, ruling that such evidence was irrelevant.72

65. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 667 & n.5.

66. 271 S.C. 276, 246 S.E.2d 606 (1978). Notably, the Holtzscheiter court's
declaration of the circumstances in which a libel per quod may be actionable without
proof of special damage, see supra note 64, is more specific than the "'special
damage or extrinsic facts' rule" discussed in Capps, 271 S.C. at 285, 246 S.E.2d at
611. The Capps court made no reference to treating libel per quod like slander per
se. For a discussion of jurisdictions that treat libel per quod like slander for purposes
of the special damage requirement, see SMOLLA, supra note 63, § 7.07[2], at 7-14.
67. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 665. Holtzscheiter's complaint also included an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.

68. Id.
69. Brief of Appellant at 3 (quoting Record at 6).
70. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 665. The trial court also directed a verdict for
the Newspaper in the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, concluding
that the Newspaper's conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to
support that cause of action. Id. at 667.
71. Id. at 665.
72. Id.
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The supreme court reversed the trial court's grant of a directed
verdict in the defamation action.' The majority noted that the statement
in the article was "ambiguous," but concluded that the article "could be
read, on its face," to be defamatory, i.e., libel per se.74 Therefore, it
was not necessary for Holtzscheiter to prove special damage, and the
trial court should have allowed the case to go to the jury.75
The court also determined that the trial court erred in limiting
testimony about the article's effect on readers.76 According to Nettles
v. MacMillan Petroleum Corp.,' evidence of how a witness understood
allegedly defamatory language is admissible if "'the meaning of the
words is doubtful or ambiguous.'"7 Because the majority determined
that the Newspaper article was "ambiguous," the Holtzscheiter court
ruled that the trial court should not have excluded evidence of how
witnesses perceived the words.79
Justices Toal and Gregory disagreed with the majority's application
of the defamation law of South Carolina in this case. 0 According to

73. Id. at 666. In addition, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict for the Newspaper in the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 667. The court analyzed the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as stated in Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981), and
concluded "that the language of the article was not so extreme and outrageous as to
exceed all possible bounds of decency." Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 667.
Importantly, the court must make an initial determination of whether the
defendant's actions "'may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as
to permit recovery, and only where reasonable persons might differ is the question
one for the jury.'" Id. at 666 (quoting Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 167, 321 S.E.2d 602, 609 (Ct. App. 1984), rev'd in parton
othergrounds, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985)).
74. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 666. A statement is considered "'defamatory if
it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.'" Id. at
669 (Toal, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977)).
75. Id. at 666.
76. Id. at 667.
77. 210 S.C. 200, 42 S.E.2d 57 (1947).
78. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting Nettles, 210 S.C. at 204, 42
S.E.2d at 58).
79. Id. The court concluded that the article in question is ambiguous because it
is capable of several interpretations, at least one of which may be defamatory. Id. at
666.
80. Id. at 667 (Toal, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion commenced with a
survey of the constitutional aspects of defamation law as addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in the line of cases following New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967). Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 667-69 (Toal, J., dissenting).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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Justice Toal's dissenting opinion, the majority's conclusion that the
article is libel per se is not consistent with the introduction of additional
evidence about the meaning of the publication."1 Furthermore, Justice
Toal asserted that a statement cannot logically be both libelous on its face
and ambiguous.'
At first blush, the conclusion that a statement is libel per se seems
inconsistent with allowing evidence regarding the meaning of the
statement.83 However, upon closer examination, it is apparent that
Justice Chandler's opinion for the majority is the proper application of
the South Carolina law of libel. The distinction between libel per se and
libel per quod turns solely on whether extrinsic evidence is necessary to

The dissent concluded that the instant case should be governed by Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), because
Holtzscheiter is a private figure suing a media defendant regarding a matter of only
private concern. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 669 (Toal, J., dissenting). Although
Dun & Bradstreetconcerned a nonmedia defendant, Justice Toal predicted that, for
purposes of defamation, the "media/nonmedia distinction is irrelevant." Id. at 669
(citing Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 781-84) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). In Dun &
Bradstreeta plurality of the Court held that, in a defamation case involving a private
figure plaintiff and a nonmedia defendant, "permitting recovery of presumed and
punitive damages ...

absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First

Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public
concern." 472 U.S. at 763.
Although the dissent's brief digression into modem defamation law and the First
Amendment is informative, it strays somewhat from the central issue before the
court. As Justice Toal noted, neither the majority nor the parties on appeal addressed
the impact of the United States Supreme Court's defamation cases. Holtzscheiter,411
S.E.2d at 667 (Toal, J., dissenting).
81. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 670 & n.7 (Toal, J., dissenting).
82. Id. Additionally, because the dissenters believed that the article was
substantially true, they would have affirmed the directed verdict for the Newspaper.
Id. at 670-71 (Toal, J. dissenting) (citing Dauterman v. State-Record Co., 249 S.C.
512, 154 S.E.2d 919 (1967) (per curiam)). But see id. at 666 n.4 (discussing the
appropriate standard of appellate review of a directed verdict).
Finally, Justice Toal's dissent concluded with her opinion that the newspaper
article "was actionable if at all as an 'invasion of privacy' claim" for "'publicizing
..private affairs of no legitimate public concern.'" Id. at 671 (Toal, J., dissenting)
(quoting Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 123, 314 S.E.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 1984)).
Although the question of whether the article involves a matter of public concern is
open for debate, Justice Toal's dicta presents some potentially unsettling implications
for newspapers or other members of the news-reporting media.
83. The fundamental disagreement between the majority and the dissent hinges
on this apparent inconsistency. Compareid. at 670 n.7 (Toal, J., dissenting) with id.
at 667 n.5.
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discover a defamatory meaning.' In the instant case, the court correctly
classified the newspaper article as libel per se because the defamatory
meaning of the statement may be inferred without reference to any
extrinsic evidence.' s Whether the statement actually is defamatory is a
question of fact for the jury. 6
In conclusion, the common-law development of the law of defamation has created a very complex and confusing set of requirements for
recovering in an action for libel. In Holtzscheiter the 'court correctly
determined that the appellant did not have to prove special damages
because the allegedly defamatory article could be interpreted as libelous
on its face. Therefore, the trial court should have allowed the jury to
resolve this defamation action.
David E. Rothstein

IV. SUPREME COURT RELAXES THE FAVORABLE TERMINATION
ELEMENT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS

In McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co. s7 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the entry of nolle prosequi 8 in a criminal case for
reasons that imply, or are consistent with, the accused's innocence

84. Id. at 665-66. As a threshold matter, if the statement may be interpreted as
defamatory without the need for facts beyond the statement itself, then that statement
may be libel per se. It is another question entirely whether the publication in fact
conveys a defamatory meaning. See id. at 667 n.5 ("[T]his evidence would not be
necessary to supply a defamatory meaning, but would merely explain whether
readers, in fact, interpreted the article to convey a libelous meaning on its face.").
See generally SMOLLA, supra note 63, § 7.06, at 7-11 to -12. Professor Smolla
provides the following as an example to distinguish libel per se from libel per quod:
mhe statement that "Mary, John's wife, had sexual intercourse with
Frank" would be actionable "per se," whereas the statement "Mary had
sexual intercourse with Frank" would not be actionable "per se," because
proof of the extrinsic fact that Mary is married to John and not Frank
would be necessary to establish the defamatory meaning.

Id.
85. Holtzscheiter, 411 S.E.2d at 666. Although the court determined rather
conclusorily that the article was libel per se, the record does contain evidence that
may indicate that Holtzscheiter's reputation was injured by the article's implication
that "she was an unfit mother and, as such, had contributed to Shannon's death." Id.
at 665.
86. Id. at 666 & n.4.
87. 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887 (1991).
88. A prosecutor enters a "nolle prosequi" on the record to indicate that he will
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
prosecute a case no further. State v. Gaskins, 263 S.C. 343, 347, 210 S.E.2d 590,
592 (1974). "Nolle prosequi" is commonly referred to as "nol pros." BLACK'S LAW
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constitutes a termination in favor of the accused sufficient to support a
subsequent claim for malicious prosecution. 9 The McKenney case
reverses the supreme court's long-standing position that the entry of nolle
prosequi cannot support an action for malicious prosecution. 9
Ronald McKenney ("McKenney") wrote a check for $3.55 to the
Jack Eckerd Co. ("Eckerd"), but because of a bank error, the check was
returned for insufficient funds. Although the bank promptly notified
Eckerd of the mistake, Eckerd obtained a fraudulent check warrant
against McKenney approximately one month later. After the solicitor
entered nolle prosequi in the case against McKenney, McKenney sued
Eckerd for malicious prosecution. Applying the old rule that a nolle
prosequi cannot support a malicious prosecution claim, the trial court
granted Eckerd's motion for summary judgment." The court of appeals
upheld the trial court's ruling, but urged the supreme court to grant
certiorari and modify its decision.'
The issue before the supreme court in McKenney was whether entry
of nolle prosequi is a sufficient termination of the proceedings in favor
of the plaintiff to support an action for malicious prosecution.93 State
courts have generally taken one of three approaches in deciding this
issue. The first approach is consistent with the former South Carolina
rule that an entry of nolle prosequi does not satisfy the favorable
termination element of a malicious prosecution claim.94 The second

89. McKenney, 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 888.
90. Mack v. Riley, 282 S.C. 100, 316 S.E.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled
by McKenney, 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887; Heyward v. Cuthbert, 15 S.C.L. (4
McCord) 345 (1827), overruledby McKenney, 304 S.C. 21,402 S.E.2d 887; Smith
v. Shackleford, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 36 (1817), overruledby McKenney, 304
S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887.
91. McKenney, 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 887.
92. McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 299 S.C. 523, 524-25, 386 S.E.2d 263, 264
(Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887 (1991).
93. In order to recover for malicious prosecution in South Carolina, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the initiation of judicial proceedings, (2) by the defendant, (3)
termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff, (4) malice by the defendant
in initiating the proceedings, (5) lack of probable cause in initiating the proceedings,
and (6) damages resulting from the defendant's conduct. Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc.,
265 S.C. 563, 566, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975) (citing Parrott v. Plowden Motor
Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965)); Gibson v. Brown, 245 S.C.
547, 549, 141 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1965) (citing 34 AM. JUR. Malicious Prosecution§
6 (1941)).
94. See cases cited supra note 90 and accompanying text. To the author's
knowledge, only Maine continues to adhere to this rule. See Garing v. Fraser, 76
Me. 37, 42 (1884). Even in Maine, however, an entry of nolle prosequi is a
termination in favor of the accused if entered over the accused's objection. Bickford
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approach holds that the entry of any nolle prosequi satisfies the favorable
termination element regardless of the reasons underlying the decision to
dismiss the charges. 5 The final approach, the majority view adopted by
the McKenney court, finds the favorable termination element satisfied
only when criminal charges are dismissed for reasons tending to show the
accused's innocence. 96
The McKenney court's decision to adopt the majority rule is sound.
The prior South Carolina rule was unduly harsh because it permitted a
person maliciously to institute a criminal action against another without
probable cause, while eviscerating any remedy of the aggrieved party.
After a conscientious solicitor properly dismissed the unfounded criminal
charges, the accused was barred from suing for malicious prosecution.
This paradoxical rule forced an innocent party to object to the dismissal
of the baseless charges against him and risk proceeding to trial in order
to preserve his civil remedy. Even disregarding the obvious unfairness
involved, this waste of judicial resources at trial is hardly a desirable
result for an already overloaded court system.
Furthermore, the more liberal view of permitting a malicious
prosecution claim based on any unbargained-for nolle prosequi is equally
undesirable. Prosecutors often dismiss criminal charges for merely
procedural or technical reasons, e.g., because of failure to locate a
necessary witness or because evidence has not yet been processed by
state laboratories. Additionally, evidence of additional criminal activity
is occasionally discovered after the filing of initial charges. For reasons
of strategy or efficiency, the initial charges may be dismissed and refiled
later along with additional charges that developed during the subsequent
investigation. Allowing a malicious prosecution suit to proceed in any of

v. Lantay, 394 A.2d 281, 283 (Me. 1978).
95. See, e.g., Woodyatt v. Bank of Old York Rd., 182 A.2d 500,501 (Pa. 1962)

("['I]f . . . the charges are withdrawn by the prosecutor, this is sufficient to satisfy
the requisite element of prior favorable termination of the criminal action."); Niese
v. Klos, 222 S.E.2d 798, 801 (Va. 1976) (holding that entry of nolle prosequi

terminated the prosecution "in a manner not unfavorable to plaintiff for purposes of
instituting a malicious prosecution action").
96. McKenney, 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 888 (characterizing the newly
adopted rule as the majority approach); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 660 cmt. a (1976) ("Proceedings are 'terminated in favor of the accused,'. . . only

when their final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused."); 54
C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 56 (1987) ("Mhe abandonment [of a prosecution]
must have been under circumstances or for reasons which imply or are consistent
with the innocence of [the] accused.").
97. See Wynne v. Rosen, 464 N.E.2d 1348, 1352 (Mass. 1984).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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these instances would be improper because an appropriate criminal
prosecution would be forthcoming.
The McKenney ruling strikes a balance between the two alternatives
of permitting legitimate malicious prosecution claims and barring
frivolous claims. Moreover, by placing the, burden on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the criminal charges against him were dismissed for
reasons that indicate his innocence,9" the supreme court encourages the
reporting of crime and remains "solicitous of the honest efforts of
citizens to assist in enforcing the law.""
However, the McKenney court failed to articulate what constitutes
sufficient reasons for implying the innocence of the accused. This omission raises questions in two common situations. The first involves
dismissal of charges by a solicitor pursuant to an agreement or compromise with the accused. Ordinarily, a dismissal of this type is not
sufficiently indicative of the accused's innocence to constitute favorable
termination."w In fact, an agreement of this type is tantamount to an
admission that probable cause existed. Undoubtedly, the South Carolina
Supreme Court will eventually find that such agreements to dismiss
charges would preclude an action for malicious prosecution.
Prosecutors also commonly enter nolle prosequi to drop criminal
charges against an accused after a certain period of good behavior.'
In South Carolina, the Pretrial Intervention Act"° provides for the
dismissal of charges against an accused after successful completion of a
mandated program. 0 3 The purpose of such programs is to show

98. See McKenney, 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 888 ("[W]here an accused
establishes that charges were nolle prossed [sic] for reasons which imply or are
consistent with innocence, an action for malicious prosecution may by maintained.")
(emphasis added).
99. Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 567, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651
(1975).
100. See Liuv. Mandina, 396 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that a nolle prosequi obtained by accused's promise to make restitution is not
termination in the accused's favor as to support action for malicious prosecution);
Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229 (111. 1980) (holding that
dismissal of theft charges against accused upon his agreement to pay restitution did
not constitute favorable termination that would support claim for malicious
prosecution); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 660(a) (1976); 52 AM.
JuR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 35 (Supp. 1991).
101. See, e.g., Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that under New York law dismissal of charges after six months of good
behavior by the accused did not permit the accused to sue for malicious prosecution),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-22-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-22-150 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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leniency to first-time offenders and to avoid the stigma of a criminal
conviction." The dismissal of charges does not imply the innocence
of a person who successfully completes the pretrial intervention program.
Furthermore, if an entry of nolle prosequi resulting from the program
sufficiently supported a malicious prosecution action, solicitors would be
less likely to use pretrial intervention. 5 Consequently, South Carolina
courts should hold that dismissal of criminal charges after completion of
a pretrial intervention program does not indicate the accused's innocence
and, therefore, does not support a malicious prosecution claim.
The rule announced in McKenney brings South Carolina in line with
the majority of other states. Plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions
must now prove that the prior criminal charges against them were
dismissed for reasons that imply their innocence. This rule is the best of
the three alternatives available and adequately addresses the competing
policy considerations involved. Until the supreme court defines the
circumstances in which an entry of nolle prosequi demonstrates the
innocence of an accused, this area of the law will provide fertile ground
for appeals.
Michael R. Smith
V. SUPREME COURT NARROWS STATUTORY EXEMPTION UNDER THE
SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

In Ward v. Dick Dyer & Associates1°6 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that only those activities allowed or authorized by statutes or
regulatory agencies are exempt from the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (UTPA).lw The court significantly narrowed the scope
of the exemption provision of the UTPA'10 by modifying or overruling

104. See Singleton, 632 F.2d at 194.

105. See id.
106. 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310 (1991).
107. Id. at 154-55, 403 S.E.2d at 311-12. The South Carolina Unfair Trade

Practices Act is codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
In Ward the court also held that corrective action taken by the defendant
subsequent to the challenged transaction is not a defense to an allegation of
wilfulness. Ward, 304 S.C. at 158, 403 S.E.2d at 313. The defendant's corrective
action was an offer to replace or repurchase the allegedly defective automobile sold
to the plaintiffs. Id. at 154, 403 S.E.2d at 311.
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section of the
UTPA is discussed infra note 113.
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several previous South Carolina decisions that applied the "'general
activity' test. " 09
In Ward the plaintiffs brought action for fraud and unfair trade
practice after the defendant dealership. failed to disclose that the car the
plaintiffs purchased had previously been in an accident. The trial court
dismissed the plaintiffs' unfair trade practice claim because the dealership's actions were already regulated by a South Carolina state agency
and thus, exempt from UTPA coverage. 110 Both parties appealed.III
The trial court based the dismissal of the UTPA claim on State ex
rel. McLeod v. Rhoades,"' in which the supreme court construed
section 39-5-40(a)"' of the UTPA. 1 14 In Rhoades the court interpreted section $9-5-40(a) to mean that, when a party claiming an exemption
from the UTPA shows that "'the general activity in question is regulated
by"' an official agency or officer, the complainant has the burden of
showing that the activity in question is not exempt from the UTPA. 115
16
Because automobile sales are regulated by statute in South Carolina,'
the trial court in Ward correctly applied the general activity test of
Rhoades by dismissing the plaintiffs UTPA claim.
On appeal in Ward, the plaintiffs argued that the supreme court
should narrow the general activity test of Rhoades so that automobile
sales are not exempt from the UTPA." 7 The court agreed and con-

109. Ward, 304 S.C. at 155, 157, 403 S.E.2d at 311-13. See infra note 115 and

accompanying text for a discussion of the general activity test and previous
applications of this test by South Carolina courts.

110. Ward, 304 S.C. at 154,403 S.E.2d at 311. The trial court also dismissed the
dealership's defense that it had offered to replace or repurchase the allegedly

defective car on the grounds that settlement offers are not admissible into evidence.
Id.
111. Id.
112. 275 S.C. 104, 267 S.E.2d 539 (1980), modified by Ward, 304 S.C. at 157,
403 S.E.2d at 313.
113. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section provides
that the UTPA shall not apply to "[a]ctions or transactions permitted under laws
administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this

State or the United States or actions or transactions permitted by any other South
Carolina State law." Id.
114. Ward, 304 S.C. at 154, 403 S.E.2d at 311.
115. Rhoades, 275 S.C. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting State v. Piedmont
Funding Corp., 382 A.2d 819, 822 (R.I. 1978)). This rule is often referred to as the
"general activity" test. Id.
116. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-15-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (regulating
automobile manufacturing, distribution, and sales).
117. Brief of Respondents-Appellants at 7.
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cluded that previous interpretations of the exemption provision" were
too broad to serve the UTPA's underlying purpose of "prohibiting unfair
trade practices." 1 9 The court noted that the exemption provision is
intended to prevent a party from being sued under the UTPA for
activities authorized by other laws or regulations. 2 ' The legislature
enacted section 39-5-40(a) to prevent conflicts of laws, not to exempt
every type of regulated activity.2 Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's UTPA claims against
the defendant automobile dealership."
Several states with unfair trade practice provisions similar to section
39-5-40(a) continue to exempt generally regulated activities in their
statutes. " The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act exempts
"[t]ransactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered
by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the

118. See e.g., Anderson v. Citizens Bank, 294 S.C. 387, 365 S.E.2d 26 (Ct.
App. 1987) (holding banking practices exempt from UTPA), overruled in part by
Ward, 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310; Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc., 293 S.C.
191, 359 S.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding mobile home sale exempt from
UTPA), overruledin part by Ward, 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310.
119. Ward, 304 S.C. at 155-56, 403 S.E.2d at 312.
120. 1d. at 156, 403 S.E.2d at 312. The court adopted the reasoning of the
Tennessee Court of Appeals which interpreted a similar statutory exemption. Id.
(citing Skinner v. Steele, 730 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)). The Ward court
noted that sales of securities shall remain exempt from the UTPA because such
transactions are so strictly regulated. Id. at 155 n.1, 403 S.E.2d at 312 n.1.
121. See id. at 156, 403 S.E.2d at 312.
122. Id. at 157, 403 S.E.2d at 313. In addition, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the dealership's offer to replace or repurchase the defective
car was inadmissible to show the dealership's lack of bad faith. Id. at 157-58, 403
S.E.2d at 313. The court held that "[s]ubsequent actions on the part of [the
defendant] do not affect the alleged wrongdoing at the time of the sale and therefore
such actions may not constitute a defense." Id. at 158, 403 S.E.2d at 313. The
court's holding on this issue demonstrates a distinction between lack of bad faith
regarding mitigation of damages and lack of bad faith as a defense to wilfulness.
Lack of bad faith remains relevant to the issue of whether punitive damages are
warranted in a given situation, and Ward does not change this principle. See F.
PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 301

(1990). Bad faith exists, if at all, at the time of the transaction; therefore, the court's
reasoning that subsequent ameliorative actions do not constitute a defense to bad faith
during the transaction is both logical and appropriate.
123. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga.
1983); Connelly v. Housing Auth., 567 A.2d 1212 (Conn. 1990); First of Me.
Commodities v. Dube, 534 A.2d 1298 (Me. 1987).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/19
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state or of the United States."124 Interpreting this statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a municipal housing authority's actions are
exempt from the Act because "the actions of the defendant ..
are
expressly authorized and pervasively regulated by both the state
department of housing and HUD."'"
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine interpreted its
Unfair Trade Practices Act as exempting real estate brokers' activities
because those activities are regulated by the Maine Real Estate Commission.' 26 Finally, a United States district court in' Georgia interpreted
a provision of Georgia's version of the Unfair Trade Practices Act as
exempting specifically regulated conduct. 7 Thus, the Taylor court held
that securities transactions are exempt under Georgia law because they
are heavily regulated by federal statutes. 2
Although these decisions would support continued application of the
general activity test in South Carolina, they are not persuasive under
South Carolina's statutory scheme. Section 39-5-40(a) does not exist in
a vacuum. Within this very section, the UTPA also exempts innocent
media publications of false or misleading advertising, 9 transactions
involving insurance sales,' 30 and practices that comply with statutes and
regulations 'administered by the Federal Trade Commission.' 3 ' Interpreting section 39-5-40(a) to exempt generally regulated activities
"renders the third and fourth exemptions superfluous, severely limits the
coverage of an act intended to have general application, and raises the
difficult problem of determining when another agency or state statute
sufficiently regulates or controls challenged conduct to establish the
exemption. " 132
The UTPA itself provides the most persuasive proof that the regulated
activity exemption of Rhoades is not the proper interpretation of section
39-5-40(a). According to section 39-5-160 of the Act, "[tihe powers and
remedies provided by this article shall be cumulative and supplementary

124. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 10c (West 1987). This language is almost
identical to South Carolina's provision. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a) (Law. Coop. 1976).

125. Connelly, 567 A.2d at 1216.
126. Dube, 534 A.2d at 1302.
127. Taylor, 572 F. Supp. at 675. Georgia's Unfair Trade Practices Act exempts
"specifically authorized" activities. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-396(a) (Michie 1982).
128. Taylor, 572 F. Supp. at 675.
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).

130. Id. § 39-5-40(c).
131. Id. § 39-5-40(d).
132. Richard E. Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade PracticesAct: Sleeping
Giant or Illusive Panacea?,33 S.C. L. REV. 479, 500 (1982).
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to all powers and remedies otherwise provided by law.""' The very
language of the Act suggests that the legislature intended to provide
remedies in addition to those found in statutes or regulations governing
the allegedly wrongful conduct. Consequently, even if an activity is
heavily regulated, a party should not be precluded from bringing a UTPA
claim for an unfair or deceptive practice arising out of that regulated
activity.
In Scott v. Mid CarolinaHomes, Inc.134 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals first expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations of the
' By narrowing
general activity test. 35
the application of section 39-540(a) to exempt only those activities specifically authorized by regulatory
agencies or statutes, the South Carolina Supreme Court now has adopted
the sensible interpretation
urged by the court of appeals and legal
36
1
commentators.
Michael R. Smith

133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
134. 293 S.C. 191, 359 S.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1987), overruledin part by Ward
v. Dick Dyer & Assocs., 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310 (1991).
135. Id. at 200-01, 359 S.E.2d at 297. In Scott the defendant argued that mobile
home sales were exempt from the UTPA as a generally regulated activity. The court
of appeals reluctantly agreed, but openly invited the supreme court to reconsider the
general activity test. Id. For examples of cases prior to Ward that apply a narrower
definition of the general activity test, see Tousley v. North American Van Lines, 752
F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1985) and Bocook Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Sunmey Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 294 S.C. 169, 363 S.E.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1987).
136. See Day, supra note 132, at 500 (urging that "permitted" in section 39-540(a) be interpreted as "expressly permitted").
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